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Abstract
We study a decentralized channel allocation problem in an ad-hoc Internet of Things (IoT) network underlaying on
a spectrum licensed to an existing wireless network. In the considered IoT network, the impoverished computation
capability and the limited antenna number on the IoT devices make them difficult to acquire the Channel State
Information (CSI) for the multi-channels over the shared spectrum. In addition, in practice, the unknown patterns of
the licensed users’ transmission activities and the time-varying CSI due to fast fading or mobility of the IoT devices
can also cause stochastic changes in the channel quality. Therefore, decentralized IoT links are expected to learn their
channel statistics online based on the partial observations, while acquiring no information about the channels that they
are not operating on. Meanwhile, they also have to reach an efficient, collision-free solution of channel allocation on
the basis of limited coordination or message exchange. Our study maps this problem into a contextual multi-player,
multi-arm bandit game, for which we propose a purely decentralized, three-stage policy learning algorithm through
trial-and-error. Our theoretical analysis shows that the proposed learning algorithm guarantees the IoT devices to
jointly converge to the social-optimal channel allocation with a sub-linear (i.e., polylogarithmic) regret with respect
to the operational time. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm strikes a good balance between
efficient channel allocation and network scalability when compared with the other state-of-the-art distributed multi-
armed bandit algorithms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the global proliferation of the Internet-connected devices, the novel use cases spawned by the
research of the next-generation wireless technologies envision to support (massive) Internet-of-things (IoT)
communications towards 5G. In typical application scenarios such as advanced metering and monitoring
infrastructures for smart city/industry, the mIoT networks are based on the co-channel deployment of the
computation/power-limited Machine-Type Communication (MTC) devices [1], [2] over unlicensed frequency
bands (e.g., MultiFire over LTE [3]). Meanwhile, these novel IoT-centric applications demand frequent
transmission of small-size data either directly between massive MTC devices [4] or by these devices over
uplinks to IoT gateways. Thereby, to meet such specific demands, mIoT is expected to support the high-
volume, delay-sensitive traffic of small and periodical data. The unique characteristics of mIoT imposes
a series of challenges to the adaptation of the existing MAC protocols in protocol design. Especially, the
networks are expected to support applications requiring a relatively high degree of reliability, efficiency and
scalability, but on a basis of light-weight MAC mechanisms and minimum infrastructure, mainly due to the
constraints of device complexity and power resources.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of handling an anarchy group of low-complexity IoT devices
for their connection over the unlicensed bandwidth in a decentralized manner. More specifically, this study
is inspired by the scenario where the IoT network underlays on the bandwidth of a licensed (cellular)
network. In a typical setting of heterogeneous narrow-band IoT networks, the underlaying IoT transmission
is able to retain an efficient data rate by adopting a proper resource-block spreading factor, while causing
negligible interference to the licensed (cellular) users by scaling the transmit power accordingly [5]. Due
to the limited computing/sensing capability of the low-power, light-weight IoT devices, it is impractical for
the IoT devices to perform simultaneous, real-time channel estimation for multiple bands with unknown,
time-varying activities of the licensed users. Also, due to the limited signaling capability of the IoT devices,
a pure contention-based or reservation-based channel allocation scheme (e.g., random access or coordinated
access) may not be able to meet the requirements of scalability, efficiency and reliability at the same
time. For this reason, we aim to propose a low-complexity, purely decentralized allocation scheme that is
able to associate the logical channels over the unlicensed bandwidth with each ad-hoc IoT device, while
guaranteeing the social performance of the considered IoT network.
To achieve the two-fold goal of decentralized social-optimal channel allocation, we propose a framework
of Multi-Player (MP) Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) for the IoT devices to gradually learn their performance
over each channel and then resolve the channel contention problem without explicit signaling. More
specifically, we formulate the IoT devices as the players of an MAB game, and the fading channels as the
stochastic arms of the MAB. To reflect the interference from the co-existing transmission of the licensed
spectrum users, we further extend our framework of MP-MAB formulation by considering the underlying
arm-value distribution to be non-stationary. In particular, the instantaneous value of an arm for each player
(i.e., established link) is determined by the transmission context that the underlying licensed user happens
to operate upon. Such an assumption is a multi-player extension of the contextual MAB problem [6], where
the payoff function of each arm for every player is jointly determined by the context (i.e., environmental
information) and the players’ actions. The goal of investigating this contextual MP-MAB is to find the
optimal policy mapping from the random samples of context-reward pairs to a sequence of actions of
channel association that maximizes the sum of received reward by the players along the time horizon. We
propose a purely decentralized algorithm for the IoT devices to learn their policies of channel association
in real time. As we will show in our algorithm design, the proposed learning scheme does not request the
estimation of Channel State Information (CSI) or much a-priori knowledge about the stochastic model of
context evolution. The proposed online learning algorithm can be considered to be a multi-player extension
of the learning scheme in single-player contextual MAB [7]. Our theoretical analysis shows that it is able
to achieve polynomial logarithmic regret over time and handle a large number of discrete contexts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the related works in the recent literature. Section III
mathematically transform the considered channel-allocation problem into a contextual MP-MAB game,
based on which we propose the purely decentralized social-optimal policy learning algorithm in Section IV.
The efficiency of the proposed algorithm is mathematically analyzed in Sections V and VI, where Section V
provides the theoretical bound on the regret of the proposed algorithm for contextual MP-MAB, and
Sections VI analyzes the efficiency of the proposed algorithm when the contexts are not observable to the
players. Section VII provides a series of experiment/simulation results regarding the proposed algorithm
for heterogeneous IoT networks over unlicensed spectrum. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Channel Access Mechanisms for IoT Networks
The reservation-based MAC protocols, such as the canonical F/T/C-DMA or OFDMA schemes, face
a critical issue of poor scalability in IoT networks. For these protocols, coordination over a dedicated
feedback/control channel by the Access Points (APs) in a cellular infrastructure (e.g., the uplink resource
allocation by eNBs in 3GPP NB-IoT networks [8]) is also necessary. On the other hand, the contention-
based protocols, e.g., ALOHA and CSMA/CA, face the issue of inefficiency for large-scale M2M networks.
As a result, the hybrid MAC scheme is studied by a number of works in the literature [9], [10] when a
centralized coordinator (e.g., AP) is available in the IoT network. The hybrid MAC schemes are featured
by the aggregation of the contention-based and the reservation-based protocols. They allow the network to
guarantee fairness among contending users with ALOHA/CSMA-like schemes. The rate efficiency is then
provided with pre-allocated orthogonal resources (e.g., time slots or sub-carriers) to a selected group of
devices that win the resource request contention.
When APs (namely, infrastructure) are non-existent, self-organization is needed on the IoT device level
using simple synchronization schemes. Then, random-access based on contentions becomes more suitable
than the reservation-related schemes. In the scenario of multi-channel association with a dedicated common
control channel, channel-contention resolution based on the RTS/CTS dialog over the control channels are
proposed for devices equipped with multiple antennas/sensors [11]. Alternatively, decentralized channel
swapping mechanisms are proposed for the case in which no coordination channel is accessible for time-
synchronized nodes [12], [13] or for nodes even without global synchronization [14]. Usually, nodes over
each channel are assumed to be fully connected to avoid the hidden terminal problem. In different studies,
an operational phase of broadcasting beacon packets over randomly selected channels is commonly adopted
to either determine the level of congestion [12] or to locate free bands [13], [14] for collision avoidance.
Particular mechanisms such as master node (known as SYNC node in [12]) election are proposed to
designate the IDs of nodes and channels that swapping/hopping is allowed for [12], [13], in order to
achieve a convergent solution among the decentralized devices.
However, most contention/swapping-based decentralized MAC schemes in the literature prioritize non-
colliding channel allocation over achieving social-optimal network performance. Furthermore, another ob-
stacle for designing an efficient, decentralized MAC scheme over multi-channels lies in the lack of channel
information in an unknown time-varying wireless environment. As a result, the demand for optimal de-
centralized MAC schemes inspires the adoption of a number of distributed stochastic learning algorithms,
which range from decentralized stochastic learning automata in repeated channel allocation games [15] to
channel allocation in a framework of MP-MAB based on distributed auction [16] or hopping [17] with
certain levels of message exchanges.
B. MP-MAB for Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
In wireless networking, the MAB-based formulation was first introduced for the single-user-multi-channel
selection problem in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), where channel states are stochastic and not fully
observable due to the unknown activities of the primary user [18]. In the single-player scenario, one single
player learns its best policy of pulling arms (i.e., selecting channels) through repeatedly playing one of the
candidate arms and observing the payoff of the pulled arms in a time-slotted manner [19]. When the pulled
arm yields i.i.d. random rewards following a certain distribution of unknown parameters, such a fixed but
unknown distribution can be used for abstracting the unknown wireless environment, i.e., the quality of
each orthogonal channel. The goal of the single player is to maximize the expected accumulated reward,
namely, the achievable transmit rate in the long run. Unlike supervised learning, the value of each arm in
the MAB is not known in advance, and the player is only able to observe the value of the pulled arm, one
at each time slot. Therefore, it is necessary to infer the arm-values from such historical partial observation
through trial and error. Essentially, the solution to this well-know problem is about striking a trade-off
between policy exploitation and exploration. Namely, the player needs to properly choose whether to gain
the myopic optimal reward, or to further improve its arm-value estimation in order to avoid choosing a
sub-optimal arm in the long run. The former goal is achieved by selecting the best arm/channel according
to the available observation record, and the latter is achieved through proper policy exploration.
It is natural to extend the problem formulation from the single-player MAB to the case of MP-MAB [20],
especially in the multi-node context of CRNs. At each round of play in the MP-MAB, every player
chooses one arm to pull according to its own observation history of arm-value feedback, while a certain
level of coordination (i.e., messaging between devices) may be allowed based on different assumptions of
information exchange capabilities [21]–[24]. When the channels are perceived as different arms, the rewards
of the same arm observed by different players are frequently assumed to be drawn from different stationary
but unknown i.i.d. distributions (e.g., [13]), which reflects the independent pathloss and shadowing properties
of different user links over the same channel. With such a multi-player formulation, a repeated game of
heterogeneous players evaluating player-dependent rewards over the candidate channels (i.e., multi-arms)
can be developed. Due to decentralized and simultaneous policy selection, collisions have to be taken into
consideration when more than one player happen to choose the same arm. For this situation, a number of
studies [21]–[23] assume that no player receives any reward, while some other studies [20] assume that the
colliding players split the reward over the single arm in an arbitrary way. Such a model is frequently used
to describe the user-channel matching problem in a CRN, where the channel condition is modeled to be
stochastic, partially due to the unpredictable activities of the primary users [16], [25].
Compared with the studies in the literature, our research further extends the expressiveness of the MP-
MAB formulation with a new dimension of freedom brought by the environmental context information [26].
In general, such a formulation allows us to further address the randomness of the environment/network
impact, which can be observed in numerous scenarios of wireless networking including network state
changes (e.g., secondary-user handing-off between cells in a CRN [27]) and cloud-side execution of
multiple tasks with different levels of Quality of Services (QoS) [28]. In the considered scenario of IoT
network operation over unlicensed spectrum, we employ a discrete set of contexts to quantitatively reflect
the interference caused to the ad-hoc IoT links by the transmission of the licensed devices. Both of our
theoretical and numerical analyses show that the proposed learning algorithm for MP-MAB is able to
address the optimal decentralized channel allocation problem with explicit respect to the stochasticity in
both the channel states and the non-controllable activities of the underlying licensed users at the same time.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an ad-hoc IoT network, where M transmitter-receiver pairs (i.e., links) attempt to transmit
over L (L ≥ M ) unlicensed channels in the underlay mode. Each link independently selects one of the
channels to transmit over, and each channel is supposed to be dedicated to at most one operating link.
During the network operation, the licensed (primary) users may cause a random level of interference
on each channel. Due to unknown stochastic user-mobility patterns and fast fading, the CSI parameters
of each IoT link over every channel are considered heterogeneous and sampled from an unknown i.i.d.
probability distribution over time. We also consider that the IoT links operate in a time-slotted manner, and
the operating slot is set to be of the same timescale as the coherence time in the scenario of fast fading
CSI. We adopt the mild assumption that at the beginning of each time slot, the IoT devices are able to
know the instantaneous but discrete levels of the licensed transmission power over the spectrum through
its beacon packets. However, they do not know either the channel statistics or the stochastic activity (e.g.,
power-selection) patterns of the licensed users. Due to the limited signal processing capability, an IoT device
is only able to measure the QoS in best-effort bitrate over its selected channel at the end of a time slot. As
a result, the IoT transmitter-receiver pairs have to deduct the information about the CSI, the device-mobility
and the interference patterns from only partial information, namely, the QoS measurement of its selected
channels over time. In addition, an IoT link has to implicitly infer the policies of the other links without
inter-link messaging, not only to avoid collisions with other devices but also to learn its policies toward
the social-optimal allocation.
The decentralized channel selection problem considered above can be formulated as an M -player, L-
arm contextual bandit game. Let x denote the context vector describing the licensed-user’s power level
over the bandwidth1. We consider that x is discretized into a finite context space X with the cardinality
1With licensed users utilizing the entire spectrum, the interference of a licensed user to one IoT link is homogeneous over each logic channel.
It may not be the same for different IoT receivers when they are randomly located/moving in the area.
|X | = X . The context evolution is independent of the players’ choices of channel association, and follows
an unknown stationary random process. When no collision over the channels (i.e., arms) occurs, the players
(i.e., IoT links) receive rewards from their selected arms (channels) by measuring the normalized QoS
feedbacks (e.g., capacity) over that channel. The players repeatedly play the game by simultaneously and
independently pulling the arms (i.e., selecting the channels), with the aim of maximizing the social reward
of all the players (i.e., the sum of best-effort transmit rates) accumulated over a finite but unknown time
horizon T . Mathematically, we abstract the multi-player contextual bandit game for channel allocation in
the ad-hoc IoT network as follows.
Definition 1 (Contextual MP-MAB). In an M -player, L-arm contextual bandit game, there is a distribution
Dm for each player m (1≤m≤M ) over the context and arm-values (x, rm,1, . . . , rm,L). rm,l∈ [0, 1] is the
normalized reward of player m on arm l∈{1, . . . , L}. During the repeated play, xt is drawn and revealed
from the independent, unknown context distribution before round t, and the potential arm rewards for each
player m are sampled from Dm. After the players take a simultaneous actions at = [at1, . . . , a
t
M ]
>, player
m receives a reward rtm,atm ∈ [0, 1] when no collision occurs over its selected arm l = atm. Otherwise, it
receives a reward of 0.
Let vt = [vt1, . . . , v
t
M ]
> denote the vector of instantaneous rewards received by the M players in round
t. Then, by taking into account the collision of players over a pulled arm, we obtain the reward of player
m, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} as
vtm(a
t) = rm,atm1
(
M∑
i=1
1(ati, a
t
m), 1
)
, (1)
where 1(a, b) is the indicator function with 1(a, b) = 1 if a = b and 1(a, b) = 0 otherwise. Let rt =
[rtm,l]
>
1≤m≤M,1≤l≤L denote the vector of the players’ arm values with respect to context x, and D be the
arbitrary distribution of the pair (x, r). Then, we aim to develop an algorithm that determines the joint policy
pi(x) : X → {1, . . . , L}M to maximize ∑Tt=1 E(xt,rt)∼D {∑Mm=1 vtm(pi(xt))}, i.e., the expected accumulated
reward. To help examining the performance of our algorithm, we introduce the concept of regret as follows.
Definition 2 (Regret for Observable Contexts). Let V (pi) = E(xt,rt)∼D
{∑M
m=1 v
t
m(pi(x
t))
}
denote the
expected reward of a joint policy pi. Let ZT = {(x1, r1), . . . , (xT , rT )} denote a series of T context-value
pairs drawn from the distribution D. Then, for an algorithm B that generates a corresponding series of
policies B = {p˜i1, . . . , p˜iT}, the expected regret of B with respect to a policy pi is
∆R(B, pi, T ) = TV (pi)− EZT∼D
[
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
vtm(p˜i
t
m)
]
. (2)
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Fig. 1. Three phases of the decentralized policy learning algorithm in synchronized time slots for a fixed-size ad-hoc IoT network.
The regret of algorithm B with respect to policy space Π is
∆R(B,Π, T ) = sup
pi∈Π
TV (pi)− EZT∼D
[
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
vtm(p˜i
t
m)
]
. (3)
An efficient decentralized policy-learning algorithm B has to achieve a sublinear regret ∆R(B,Π, T ) in
T , namely, lim
T→∞
∆R(B,Π, T )/T = 0. Due to the partial observability that rewards are only revealed for the
pulled arms, an efficiently algorithm needs to form the unbiased estimation of arm values in order to learn
the accurate matching between the arms and the players. Furthermore, a purely decentralized algorithm
needs to avoid requesting excessive exchange of action information among players. Thus, learning the
optimal arm-allocation schemes solely based on their local information is preferred.
IV. EPOCH-BASED POLICY LEARNING ALGORITHM
Since the rounds of play T is not known in advance, we divide the process of decentralized learning B in
repeated plays into epochs/mini-batches, each of which contains three explicit phases of policy exploration,
optimal-policy learning and policy exploitation. Figure 1 shows the structure of one epoch of plays from
the perspective of synchronized IoT devices. During the exploration phase, the players independently try
different arms uniformly at random in order to estimate the mean value of the payoff obtained on each arm
when no collision occurs. Consequently, with the observation accumulated in the exploration phase, the
players adopt a purely decentralized learning scheme through trial-and-error from [29] to learn the optimal
arm association. This is achieved through distributively searching the social-optimal equilibria of a group
of intermediate non-cooperative games, which are constructed based on the arm-value estimation obtained
in the exploration phase for different contexts. In the exploitation phase, the players stick to the policies
derived from the policy-learning phase for multiple rounds. Intuitively, the estimation of the expected reward
for each arm-player pair may introduce errors, and the arm allocation learned in the policy learning phase
may be sub-optimal as well. As a result, the main goal of our study is to analyze the error propagation
from the first two phases and determine the bound of the regret of the entire learning process subsequently.
The policy-learning algorithm in the mini-batch framework of Figure 1 is formally presented in Algo-
rithm 1. In the k-th epoch, the number of rounds needed for a player in the phases of exploration, trial-and-
error learning and exploitation are functions of the epoch number, i.e., f(k), g(k) and h(k), respectively.
In the exploration phase (Lines 3-9 in Algorithm 1), a single player learns independently its expected
payoff over each arm by randomly selecting its actions. In the trial-and-error learning phase, a group of
intermediate non-cooperative games are formulated based on the arm-values estimated in the exploration
phase for each context (see Lines 11-17 in Algorithm 1). The optimal player-arm matching scheme in each
context is learned in a purely decentralized manner with respect to the intermediate game (Lines 18-21 in
Algorithm 1). More specifically, instead of updating the policies according to the immediate feedback of
the random arm-values in each round, the players learn their policies in the intermediate game by fixing
the value of each arm as the estimated rewards obtained from the previous exploration phase. Following
Algorithm 2, the optimal policies are learned as the efficient Nash Equilibria (NE) of the intermediate
games. For a context x ∈ X appearing in epoch k, we use the vector of the estimated expected arm-values
[µkm,l(x)]
>
1≤m≤M,1≤l≤L in (5) to construct an intermediate M -player non-cooperative game G(x) as follows.
Definition 3 (Intermediate Non-cooperative Game). The intermediate game G(x) at the k-th epoch for
context x can be expressed in a three-tuple: G(x) = 〈M,×Am, {uxm}m∈M〉, where M = {1, . . . ,M} is
the set of players, Am = {1, . . . , L} is player m’s action set corresponding to the candidate arms, and
uxm = u
x
m(a) is the payoff of player m ∈M under a joint action a = [a1, . . . , aM ]>:
uxm(a) = µ
k
m,am(x)1
(
M∑
i=1
1(ai, am), 1
)
, (4)
where µkm,am(x) is the expected reward of arm l = am that player m estimates in the k-th exploration
phase, derived following (5).
The design of the intermediate games in Definition 3 is based on the presumption that the most efficient
equilibria of the constructed games for each x coincide with the social-optimal policies of the MP-MAB
game. The detailed discussion on the validity of this presumption will be given in Section V. To develop a
purely decentralized policy-learning scheme in Algorithm 2 for obtaining the social-optimal equilibrium of
the intermediate game G(x), we introduce the auxiliary state of player m regarding context x at time slot
Algorithm 1 Policy learning at player m in the contextual multi-player bandit game.
Initialization: Set Wm = {} and ukm,l(x) = 0 ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and ∀x ∈ X . Choose  ∈ [0, 1]
1: for Epoch k = 1, . . . , kT do
2: Exploration phase:
3: for t = 1, . . . , f(k) do
4: Sample an arm atm ∈ {1, . . . , L} uniformly at random and observe the feedback (xt, atm, vtm(at))
5: if vtm(at) 6= 0 then
6: Wm ←Wm ∪ {(xt, atm, vtm(at))}
7: Estimate the expected value of arm l = atm at x
t:
µkm,l(x
t)←
∑
(x,am,vm)∈Wm v
t
m1(am, l)1(x, x
t)∑
(x,am,vm)∈Wm 1(am, l)1(x, x
t)
(5)
8: end if
9: end for
10: Trial-and-error learning phase:
11: ∀x∈X , construct game G(x) as in Definition 3. Namely, ∀m∈M, l ∈Am, fix the perturbed arm-value as µ˜km,l(x) =
µkm,l(x) + ξm,l(x)/k, where ξm,l(x) is randomly sampled over [−ξ, ξ] with 0 < ξ < 1
12: if k = 1 then
13: ∀x∈X , set the auxiliary state at t=0 in (8) as z0m(x)=(o0m(x)=D, a0m(x), u0m(x)=0) with a random action a0m(x)
14: else
15: ∀x∈X , initialize z0m(x) with the exploitation policy in epoch k − 1 as z0m(x)=(o0m(x)=C, a∗,k−1m (x), u0m(x)=0)
16: end if
17: ∀am∈Am, set the count of times for getting a content mood with am as νkm,x(am) = 0
18: for t = 1 . . . , g(k) do
19: Update atm and z
t
m(x
t) according to Algorithm 2 for xt based on µ˜km,l(x
t), and ∀x′ 6= xt, set ztm(x′)← zt−1m (x′)
20: Update the frequency of visits to the content states aligned with benchmark values as
νkm,xt(a
t
m)← νkm,xt(atm) + 1(otm, C)1(utm(xt), ukm(xt)), (6)
where utm(x
t) is the observed payoff in the intermediate game G(xt) by player m according to (4)
21: end for
22: Exploitation phase:
23: for t = 1, . . . , h(k) do
24: For xt, play a∗,km with the maximum number of state visits according to ν
k
m,xt(l),∀l:
a∗,km (x
t) = arg max
1≤l≤L
νkm,xt(l) (7)
25: end for
26: end for
t from [29] as follows:
ztm(x) =
(
otm(x), a
t
m(x), u
t
m(x)
)
, (8)
where otm(x) ∈ {C,H,W,D} indicates the moods of player m: content (C), hopeful (H), watchful (W )
and discontent (D). atm(x) represents the benchmark action and u
t
m(x) represents the benchmark payoff
adopted by player m in round t, respectively. For simplicity, we omit x in the expressions for the same
game and define the following transition map of a finite behavior state machine for each type of players:
• A content player updates its action as atm ∈ Am with a probability:
pm(a
t
m) =


L− 1 , a
t
m 6= at−1m ,
1− , aTm = at−1m .
(9)
• A hopeful player or a watchful player always plays the previous benchmark action, i.e., atm ← at−1m .
• A discontent player selects a new action uniformly at random, namely, ∀atm ∈ Am, pm(atm) = 1/L.
With the auxiliary states defined in (8), we introduce enhanced trial-and-error learning from [29] in
Algorithm 2. Note that in Algorithm 2, G(u) and F (u) are strictly monotonically decreasing linear functions
for any u ∈ [0, 1], and the conditions 0 < G(u) < 1/2 and 0 < F (u) < 1/2M are to be satisfied (see
Theorem 2 for the details).
V. ANALYSIS OF THE REGRET FOR ALGORITHM 1
We note that in Algorithm 1, the regret is mainly due to sub-optimal actions in the exploration phase and
the trial-and-error learning phase. In the latter phase, each player is supposed to learn the optimal matching
policies while avoiding collisions in |X | intermediate games following the rules defined in Algorithm 2.
In each game G(x) (x ∈ X ), the learning processes of all the players jointly define a large discrete-time
Markov chain over the set of all possible auxiliary states (see also [29]). Therefore, the regret analysis
regarding Algorithm 1 is expected to mathematically determine the regret due to the arm-value estimation
in the exploration phase and the regret due to the sub-optimal policies derived in Algorithm 2. For ease
of exposition, we first provide the main result of the theoretical bound on the regret of Algorithm 1 in
Theorem 1, before presenting the analytical procedures for the two phases in concern.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem on the Algorithm Regret). Consider a multi-player bandit game with a finite
set of contexts, i.e., |X | = X , as defined in Definition 1. With T rounds of plays and a sufficiently small
policy-learning parameter  ∈ [0, 1] in Algorithm 1, the regret of Algorithm 1 is upper-bounded by
∆RT ≤ O(M log1+δ2 (T )), (12)
if we set f(k) = c1, g(k) = c2kδ (δ > 1) and h(k) = 2k, where c1 ≥ 16L(L+η/3)η2 with η ∈ [0, 1].
Proof Sketch. Since rtm,l ∈ [0, 1], the network-wise regret of the exploration phase and the trial-and-error
learning phase in the k-th epoch can be easily upper-bounded by M(c1 + c2kδ) in the worst case, in which
Algorithm 2 A single round of state transition by player m in G(x) at the k-th epoch.
Initialization: ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, retrieve the fixed, perturbed arm-value in the current context x as µ˜km,l(x)
1: Select atm according to state z
t−1
m (x) of the player, and observe u
t
m(x) = u
x
m(a
t) following (4)
2: if ot−1m (x) = C then
3: if atm 6= at−1m and utm(x) ≤ ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← zt−1m (x) end if
4: if atm 6= at−1m and utm(x) > ut−1m (x) then
5: Update the state ztm(x) with probability
pm(z
t
m(x)← (C, atm, utm(x))) = G(u
t
m(x)−ut−1m (x)) (10)
6: end if
7: if atm = at−1m and utm(x) > ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (H, at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
8: if atm = at−1m and utm(x) = ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← zt−1m (x) end if
9: if atm = at−1m and utm(x) < ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (W,at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
10: else if ot−1m (x) = H then
11: if utm(x) > ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (C, at−1m (x), utm(x)) end if
12: if utm(x) = ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (C, at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
13: if utm(x) < ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (W,at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
14: else if ot−1m (x) =W then
15: if utm(x) > ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (H, at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
16: if utm(x) = ut−1m (x) then ztm(x)← (C, at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
17: if utm(x) < ut−1m (x) then
18: ztm(x)← (D, at−1m (x), ut−1m (x)) end if
19: else if ot−1m (x) = D then
20: Set ztm(x)← zt−1m (x) when utm(x) = 0. Otherwise, update ztm(x) with probability pm(ztm(x)← (C, atm, utm(x))) = F (u
t
m(x)),
pm(z
t
m(x)← (D, at−1m (x), ut−1m (x))) = 1− F (u
t
m(x))
(11)
21: end if
every player at each round in these two phases produces the maximum regret of 1. Then, to bound the
regret in exploitation, we only need to bound the error probability Prke of the arm-value estimation in the
exploration phase and the probability Prkl of learning sub-optimal allocation policies in the trial-and-error
learning phase. Thus, we obtain the upper bound of the total regret of all the players in the following form:
∆Rk ≤M(c1 + c2kδ) +M(Prke + Prkl )c32k. (13)
The complete proof of Theorem 1 relies on the analysis of the error probability of the exploration phase
in Section V-A and that of the trial-and-error learning phase in Section V-B. Based on such a two-step
analysis, the detail of the proof to Theorem 1 will be given in Section V-C.
A. Error Probability of the Exploration Phase
The goal of the exploration is for every player to obtain the unbiased estimation of the mean values
of all arms in each context x ∈ X . Then, the total sampling period in the exploration phase has to be
sufficiently long since the expected sum of regret incurred by the uniformly random exploration of one
round for all players can be as large as O(M). Denote Nm = |Wm| (c.f., Line 6 of Algorithm 1) as the
number of samples accumulated by player m until the end of the current exploration phase in Algorithm 1.
We note that for an individual policy pim(x) of player m, the unbiased estimator of the reward based on
the collected data Wm in Algorithm 1 is
µˆm(pim) =
1
Nm
Nm∑
i=1
1(pim(x
i), aim)v
i
m
1/L
, (14)
where 1/L is used to adjust the impact of the uniformly random action sampling. Let µˆim(pim) =
1(pim(xi),aim)v
i
m
1/L
.
Then, we have E{µˆm(pim)} = E(x,rm)∼Dm{rm,pim}, and from (14),
Var
{
µˆim(pim)
} ≤ E {(µˆim(pim))2} = L2E {1(pim(xi), am,i)(vim)2} ≤ LE {(vim)2} ≤ L. (15)
The analysis of the upper bound of the arm-value estimation error relies on two inequalities [30] as follows.
Fact 1 (Bernstein Inequality). If for a sequence of random variables Y1, . . . , YN , Pr(|Yi| ≤ c) = 1 and
E(Yi) = 0, then for any N > 0,
Pr
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi ≥ η
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nη
2
2σ2 + 2cη/3
)
, (16)
where c is a constant and σ2 = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Var(Yi).
Fact 2 (Chernoff Inequality). If for a sequence of random variables Y1, . . . , YN , |Yi| ≤ 1, then for any
N > 0 and 0 < η < 1,
Pr
(
N∑
i=1
Yi≤(1−η)E
{
N∑
i=1
Yi
})
≤exp
(
−η2E
{
N∑
i=1
Yi
}
/2
)
. (17)
Based on (15)-(17) we obtain Lemma 1 as follows.
Lemma 1. With Algorithm 1, all the players have a sufficiently accurate arm-value estimation after T0
explorations, with T0 given by:
T0 ≥ max
(
16LX
L+ cη/3
η2
ln
(
4ML
γ
)
, 32L ln
(
2M
γ
))
. (18)
where γ is the pre-determined exploration error probability for a maximum estimation error η.
Proof. For player m which has undergone at least C rounds of valid explorations (i.e., explorations with
no collisions), the probability of not having sufficiently accurate arm-value estimations for a non-colliding
policy pim (∀m ∈M) adopted in the exploitation phase in Algorithm 1 is bounded by
Pr
(
sup
m∈M,pim
{
(µˆm(pim)−E{rm,pim})>η
∣∣∣∀m : |Wm|≥C})
(a)≤
M∑
m=1
∑
pim∈Πm
Pr
(
µˆm(pim)− E{rm,pim} > η
∣∣∣|Wm| ≥ C)
(b)≤
M∑
m=1
∑
pim∈Πm
∞∑
Nm=C
Pr
(
µˆm(pim)−E{rm,pim}>η
∣∣|Wm|=Nm)Pr(|Wm|=Nm)
Pr (|Wm| ≥ C)
≤
M∑
m=1
∑
pim∈Πm
∞∑
Nm=C
Pr
(
µˆm(pim)−E{rm,pim}>η
∣∣∣|Wm|=Nm)× Pr(|Wm|=Nm∣∣∣|Wm| ≥ C)
(c)≤
M∑
m=1
∑
pim∈Πm
∞∑
Nm=C
e−
Nmη
2
2L+2cη/3 Pr
(
|Wm|=Nm
∣∣∣|Wm| ≥ C)
≤2MLXe− Cη
2
2L+2cη/3
∞∑
N=C
Pr
(
|W|=Nm
∣∣∣Nm≥C) ≤ 2MLX exp(− Cη2
2L+ 2cη/3
)
,
(19)
where Πm is the set of deterministic policies for player m and |Πm| = LX , (a) is obtained by the union
bound, (b) is obtained following the Partition Theorem and (c) is obtained following the Bernstein Inequality
in Fact 1. To satisfy the condition of sufficient accuracy η with an error probability γ1, we have
2MLX exp
(
− Cη
2
2L+ 2cη/3
)
≤ γ1 ⇒ C ≥ 2L+ 2cη/3
η2
ln
(
2MLX
γ1
)
. (20)
Note that the above condition in (20) is obtained when the players sample the arms uniformly at random
and no collision occurs. To obtain the condition for accumulating sufficiently large number of valid arm
observations for each player, we denote Aim as the event that a player m observes any arm l ∈ Am without
experiencing collision at the i-th sample. During the exploration phase, whether experiencing a collision is
independent of the context that the game in. Then, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . we have Pr(Aim) = (1 − 1L)M−1. For a
sequence of N i.i.d. samples {Aim}Ni=1, we have
Pr
(
∃m s.t.
N∑
i=1
Aim ≤
N
2
E{Aim}
)
union bound≤
M∑
m=1
Pr
(
N∑
i=1
Aim ≤
N
2
E{Aim}
)
Fact 2≤ M exp
(
−N
8
(1− 1
L
)M−1
)
.
(21)
For the probability in (21) to be upper-bounded by γ2, we need
M exp
(
−N
8
(1− 1
L
)M−1
)
≤ γ2 ⇒ N ≥ 8(1− 1
L
)−(M−1) ln
(
M
γ2
)
. (22)
Then, with probability (1−γ2), we have ∀m ∈M,
∑N
i=1 A
i
m ≥ N2 E{Aim}. To ensure that every player has
a sufficient number of valid observations, we also need
N
2
E{Aim} ≥ C
(20)≥ 2L+ 2cη/3
η2
ln
(
2MLX
γ1
)
⇒ N ≥ 2(1− 1
L
)−(M−1)
2L+ 2cη/3
η2
ln
(
2MLX
γ1
)
.
(23)
Since for any L > 1, (1− 1
L
)M−1 ≥ 1
4L
, we have
N ≥ max
(
16L
L+ cη/3
η2
ln
(
2MLX
γ1
)
, 32L ln
(
M
γ2
))
. (24)
Let the event supm,pim (µˆm(pim)−E{rm,pim})> η be denoted by A, and the event ∀m : |Wm| ≥ C be
denoted by B. Then, (19) provides the upper bound of Pr(A|B), and (21) leads to the upper bound of
Pr(B). To guarantee that all players have satisfactory estimation errors of η for each arm, we have the
following bound:
Pr(A) = Pr(A|B) Pr(B) + Pr(A|B)Pr(B) ≤ Pr(A|B) + Pr(B) = γ1 + γ2. (25)
Then, having γ1 = γ2 = γ/2, (24) guarantees that with more than N rounds of exploration, any policy is
estimated with an error within η with probability 1− γ. This leads to (18).
From (18) in Lemma 1, we note that for an error probability of arm-value estimation with maximum
bias η, Prke = γ, Algorithm 1 needs to undergo at least T0 rounds of exploration as
T0 = 16L
L+ cη/3
η2
ln
(
4MLX
γ
)
. (26)
If the exploration has at least c1 =
16L(L+cη/3)
η2
turns at each epoch, then, at k-th epoch, for a maximum
estimation error η the error probability can be bounded as follows
c1k =
16L(L+ cη/3)
η2
k ≥ 16L(L+ cη/3)
η2
ln
(
4MLX
γ
)
⇒ Prke = γ ≤ 4MLXe−k. (27)
Note that with the normalized arm-values, we can simply choose c = 1 in (27).
B. Error Probability in the Trial-and-error Phase
In addition to Lemma 1 and (27), we need to further analyze the impact of the arm-value estimation
errors on the learning results in the trial-and-error phase. Specifically, we expect that the optimal contextual
bipartite matching policy derived based on the biased arm-value estimation is the same as the optimal policy
derived based on the real expected arm-values. Lemma 2 confirms this assumption.
Lemma 2. Assume that the expected reward estimated by player m for a non-colliding policy pim, µˆm,pim(x),
satisfies |µˆm,pim(x)− E{rm,pim|x}| ≤ η. Consider two intermediate games (c.f., Definition 3): G(x), which
is constructed upon the real expected arm-values E{rm,l|x}, and Gˆ(x), which is constructed upon the
estimated arm-values µˆm,l, respectively. For G(x) where Vpi(x) =
∑M
m=1E{rm,pim|x}, we denote an optimal
joint policy as pi∗ and a best non-optimal joint policy as p˜i. Then, if
η <
Vpi∗(x)− Vp˜i(x)
2M
, (28)
for Gˆ(x) where Vˆpi(x) =
∑M
m=1 µˆm,pim(x), we have Vˆpi∗(x)>Vˆp˜i(x) as well.
Proof. Since L ≥ M , pi∗ and p˜i must be collision-free. By inequality construction of the condition at the
beginning of Lemma 2 and the definitions of Vpi(x) and Vˆpi(x), we have (note that we omit x for conciseness)
−Mη ≤
M∑
m=1
(µˆm,pim − E{rm,pim}) ≤Mη. (29)
Then, for pi∗ we have
M∑
m=1
µˆm,pi∗m ≥
M∑
m=1
E{rm,pi∗m} −Mη = Vpi∗ −Mη. (30)
For any non-optimal policy pi, its value can be bounded by the best non-optimal policy p˜i as follows:
M∑
m=1
µˆm,pim≤
M∑
m=1
E{rm,pim}+Mη=Vpi+Mη≤Vp˜i +Mη. (31)
Subtracting (30) by (31), we obtain the following inequality with the condition η < Vpi∗ (x)−Vp˜i(x)
2M
:
Vˆpi∗ − Vˆp˜i ≥ Vpi∗ − Vp˜i − 2Mη > 0. (32)
(32) shows that for game Gˆ(x), any optimal joint policy pi∗(x) in game G(x) also achieves strictly higher
social reward than the non-optimal policies in G(x). Therefore, a social optimal policy in game Gˆ(x) must
also be optimal in G(x).
Lemmas 1 and 2 guarantee that as long as the estimation error η is small enough, the true social optimal
policy can be derived based on the biased estimation of arm-values after sufficiently long exploration in
Algorithm 1. Therefore, we only need to examine the policy efficiency of the trial-and-error learning phase
based on the rules defined in Algorithm 2. Regarding the intermediate game G(x) in context x, we have
Lemma 3. The social-optimal payoff by the players in game G(x) is achieved at a pure NE.
Proof. Lemma 3 relies on the assumption of L ≥M . We note that at epoch k, game G(x) with fixed arm
values for m ∈M, µkm,l(x), belongs to the category of one-sided matching games with user preferences [31].
Then, by randomly ordering the players in a list, and sequentially assigning each player in the list their best
available arm, we are able to obtain a non-colliding allocation ak = [ak1, . . . , a
k
M ]
>. It is straightforward to
check that ∀m ∈M, akm is a best response to the joint actions of the other players ak−m.Thus, ak constructs
a pure NE, and we know that more than one pure NE exists in G(x).
Furthermore, with L ≥ M , player m’s better response to ak−m can only be pulling a free arm. Indeed,
a player’s better response always leads to a Pareto improvement, since no other players changes their
payoffs. Then, we can check by contradiction that the social optimal policy ak,∗ in G(x), where V x(ak,∗) =
max
a
∑M
m=1 u
x,k
m (a), is also an NE. Firstly, with L ≥M , the optimal action ak,∗ has no collision. Otherwise,
a colliding player can always find a free arm as the better response, which constitutes a Pareto improvement.
Secondly, at ak,∗ no player is able to find a better response. Otherwise, at least one player m can find some
free arm a′m, that leads to a joint action a
′ = (a′m, a
k,∗
−m) s.t. V x(ak,∗) < V x(a′) =
∑
i 6=m u
x,k
i (a
k,∗
i )+u
x,k
m (a
′
m),
contradicting with the optimality assumption. Therefore, by the definition of an NE, we obtain Lemma 3.
With Lemma 3, we are left to show that the policies obtained from Algorithm 2 converge to not only
an NE, but also the most efficient NE of the intermediate game. Note that following the rules of state
transition defined in Algorithm 2, the state-updating dynamics of each player m jointly constitute a large
discrete-time Markov chain over the set of the joint auxiliary states z(x) = [z1(x), . . . , zM(x)]> as defined
in (8). Following the approach of the Markov chain-based analysis for log-linear learning in [29], we are
able to examine the efficiency of the trial-and-error learning phase in Algorithm 1 for a given intermediate
game G(x). Before proceeding, we introduce the concepts of regular perturbation and stochastically stable
states from [29], [32] for Markov chains as follows.
Definition 4 (Regular Perturbation). Let P 0 denote the transition matrix for a stationary Markov chain
over a finite state space Z , and P  ( 6= 0) be a family of perturbed Markov chains corresponding to P 0,
where  is a scalar measuring the perturbation level. P  is a regular perturbation of P 0 if (a) P  is ergodic
for all sufficiently small , (b) lim
→∞
P (z, z′) = P 0(z, z′), and (c) P (z, z′) > 0 for  implying that ∃r(z, z′)
s.t. 0 < lim
→0
P (z, z′)/−r(z,z
′) <∞. The function r(z, z′) is known as the resistance of transition z→ z′.
Definition 5 (Stochastically Stable States). Let P  be a regular perturbation of P 0 and p be its unique
stationary distribution. z ∈ Z is a stochastically stable state iff lim
→0
p(z) > 0.
By [29], we know that for a perturbed Markov process P  with a set of stochastically stable states Z∗,
there exists α > 0 for any small α > 0 s.t. whenever 0 <  ≤ α, z(t) ∈ Z∗ for at least 1−α of all periods
in the process. Therefore, it is natural to desire that the social optimal NE of a game G(x) (see Lemma 3)
constitute the stochastically stable states of the Markov process defined by the rules given in Algorithm 2
when  > 0. This is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that all players in an intermediate game G(x) follow the updating rules in Algo-
rithm 2 with the experimentation parameter  and the acceptance functions F (u) and G(u) using the same
parameters α11, α21 > 0, α12 and α22, s.t. 0 < G(u) < 1/2 and 0 < F (u) < 1/2M : F (u) = −α11u+ α12G(u) = −α21u+ α22. (33)
Then, based on (8), every stochastically stable state z∗(x) = (z∗1(x), . . . , z
∗
M(x)) maximizes the social
welfare of the game in the form of
∑M
m=1 u
x
m(a
∗
m(x)), where a
∗
m(x) is the benchmark action in z
∗
m(x) and
constitutes an NE in G(x).
Proof. Lemma 3 guarantees that the social optimal policy of game G(x) is also a pure NE. Therefore, the
learning scheme defined in Algorithm 2 satisfies condition (i) of [29, Theorem 1]. Let P (x) denote the
family of (perturbed) Markov processes defined in Algorithm 2 in a single epoch for context x. Following
the same approach of proving [29, Theorem 1], we only need to show that the social optimal NE are
stochastically stable states of P (x), namely
(a) these social welfare-maximizing NE are aligned with some states contained in the recurrent commu-
nication classes of the unperturbed process P 0(x), and
(b) in the sub-graph of states constructed over the directed transitions between the recurrence classes of
P 0(x), these NE minimize the stochastic potential (see [32] for the formal definition). Namely, there
exists a state-tree spanned on each NE state that minimizes the sum resistance of the edges (see also
Definition 4) in the tree among all the possible spanning trees in this recurrence graph.
Condition (a) relies on the identification of recurrence classes (cf. [29, Lemma 1]). Condition (b) requires
enumerating the minimum resistance of the edges ended on different states in the considered sub-graph
(cf. [29, Lemmas 2-6]).
The proof to Theorem 2 strictly follows the approach of proof to [29, Theorem 1], except the slight
difference in the interdependence property2 between game G(x) and the non-cooperative game considered
in [29]. In G(x), we note that a player i can only cause another non-colliding, non-experimenting player j’s
payoff to decrease or remain the same (both with non-zero probability) by altering its own action. Such a
“partial interdependence” property indicates that only the sub-set of non-colliding players are interdependent
on the action of the other players due to potential collision. This eliminates any path in a state graph of
2By [29], a multi-player game is interdependent if for any joint action a and any subset of players J , there exists some player i /∈ J and
two joint actions of J , aJ and a′J , s.t. when fixing the actions of the players not in J , player i’s payoff w.r.t. aJ and a′J are different.
the Markov process P (x) s.t. a non-colliding, non-experimenting player j’s state transits to mood oj = H
(i.e., observing reward increase) due to another player i’s action experimentation. Therefore, we only need
to consider the O(1) probability that one player’s experimenting action collides with another player in the
original proof to [29, Lemma 1] and obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 (Lemma 1 in [29]). Denote by D0(x) the set of the joint states z(x) ∈ Z(x), where
∀m, om(x) = D and C0(x) the set of z(x) where ∀m, om(x) = C. The recurrence classes of the unperturbed
Markov process P 0(x) are D0(x) (as a single state) and every singleton z(x) ∈ C0(x).
Following the approach of the proof to [29, Theorem 1], we denote E0(x) as the subset of C0(x) where
the benchmark actions align with a pure NE. Then, to analyze the minimum resistance of an edge out-going
from zE(x) ∈ E0(x) in the transition graph of the recurrence states, we only need to consider a single case
regarding the path between zE(x) and zD(x) ∈ D0(x). Due to partial interdependence in G(x), one single
player experimenting two consecutive times can only lead to a path of transitions C → W → D due to
twice collisions with a probability of O(2). Since any state z(x) with at least one player being discontent
has 0 resistance to D0(x) [29, Claim 1], this leads to a simplified version of the proof to [29, Lemma 2]
and thus the following propostion:
Proposition 2 (Lemma 2 in [29]). In the state graph of perturbed transitions constructed on the recurrence
classes of P 0(x), ∀ze(x) ∈ E0(x), ze(x)→ D(x) is an easy edge. Namely, ze(x)→ D(x) has a minimized
resistance of 2 among all possible out-going edges from ze(x).
The rest part of the proof follows exactly the same approach of the proof to [29, Theorem 1], where
the resistance of edges out-going from both non-equilibrium content states and discontent states are also
identified, and then the easy trees (i.e., those with the minimum sum of resistance) are constructed on each
recurrence state. Since we do not need to make any change to the intermediate proofs to [29, Lemmas 3-
6], for conciseness, we omit the details of the proof and suggest the readers to refer to [29, Section 6].
Because [29, Theorem 1] holds, by Lemma 3 we know that the stochastically stable states of P  coincide
with the social optimal NE strategies of the considered game, which completes the proof to Theorem 2.
Together with Lemma 2, Theorem 2 indicates that for the intermediate game G(x) constructed directly
upon the estimated arm-values µkm,l, we can always find an α and a sufficiently large number of rounds
s.t. each player visits the real social optimal actions of the underlying bandit game for at least 1−α of the
total trial-and-error rounds. However, if G(x) has multiple social optimal NE3, the non-cooperative players
may reach a sub-optimal joint allocation with solely the action selection scheme in Line 24 of Algorithm 1.
We overcome this uncertainty by replacing the estimated arm-values in G(x) with the randomly perturbed
values µ˜km,l(x) = µ
k
m,l(x)+ξm,l(x), where ξm,l(x) is independently sampled following a uniform distribution
over [−ξ, ξ] for context x.
Therefore, we obtain a condition that ∀l ∈ Am, |µkm,l(x)− µ˜km,l(x)| ≤ ξ. Applying the same approach of
proving Lemma 2, we can always find a sufficiently small ξ, s.t. for the optimal policy pi∗ and the best
non-optimal policy p˜i, the following inequality is satisfied
ξ <
M∑
m=1
(
µkm,pi∗m(x)− µkm,p˜im(x)
)
2M
. (34)
Thereby, any optimal NE policy of game G(x) becomes the candidate optimal NE policies of the new game
G˜(x) constructed upon the perturbed arm-value µ˜km,l(x). We consider two different and non-colliding actions
a and a′ s.t. they achieve equal social rewards in G(x), i.e., ∑m∈M µkm,am = ∑m∈M µkm,a′m . Omitting x
again, we consider the probability that a and a′ also achieve the same social reward in game G˜(x):
Pr
( ∑
m∈M
µ˜km,am =
∑
m∈M
µ˜km,a′m
)
= Pr
( ∑
m∈M
(
µˆkm,am + ξm,am
)
=
∑
m∈M
(
µˆkm,a′m + ξm,a′m
))
= Pr
( ∑
m∈M
(ξm,am − ξm,a′m) = 0
)
.
(35)
Since at least one player i ∈ M adopts different actions ai 6= a′i,
∑
m∈M
(ξm,am − ξm,a′m) is a sum of at
least two independent continuous random variables. Then, we have Pr
( ∑
m∈M
(ξm,am − ξm,a′m) = 0
)
= 0.
Therefore, the perturbation ∀m, l : ξm,l(x) guarantees that the social optimal SE of G˜(x) is unique with
probability 1. This leads to the operation in Line 11 of Algorithm 14 and Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. With a sufficiently small perturbation parameter ξ satisfying (34), the trial-and-error phase
in Algorithm 1 reaches a unique social-optimal NE of the intermediate game with probability 1.
We consider g(k) = T1 rounds of plays in the k-th trial-and-error learning phase, which contains X
independent perturbed Markov processes. Now, we are ready to examine the inherent error probability of not
reaching stochastically stable states in P (x). Suppose that each process P (x) continues for T1(x) rounds,
3We can construct such a game by setting the expected rewards of M arms to be uniformly 0 < µ < 1 for each player and the other arms
to be always 0, with the non-zero arm-values sampled from discrete distribution.
4Since the gaps between the optimal and the secondary social optimal rewards is not known in advance, we adopt a decaying factor 1/k
for the perturbation in Algorithm 1.
then we have
∑
x∈X T1(x) = T1. We denote E∗(x) the singleton of stochastically stable state that aligns with
the unique social optimal NE in context x. Then, with Line 24 of Algorithm 1, the probability of players
selecting optimal actions in the exploitation phase is determined by the frequency that ∀x ∈ X : E∗(x) are
visited. We denote Ax as the event that for context x the optimal policy is adopted after the trial-and-error
phase and A the event that for all contexts the optimal policies are adopted. Then, we have
Pr(A) = 1− Pr(A) ≥ 1− Pr( ∪
x∈X
Ax
)
union bound≥ 1− ∑
x∈X
Pr
(
Ax
)
. (36)
To bound Pr
(
Ax
)
, we apply the approach of analyzing the accumulated weights of random walks on
general (irreversible) finite-state Markov chains from [33]. At epoch k, with the initialization step in Line 12
of Algorithm 1, the trial-and-error learning process for a game G(x) constitutes a random walk of T1(x) steps
with an arbitrary initial distribution φ(x) over the states on the Markov process P (x). Let 1(zt(x), E∗(x))
indicate that the stationary stable state E∗(x) is visited at the t-th sample in the subsequence of plays
corresponding to G(x). Let αx denote the expected frequency of not visiting the stable state. Then, the
stationary distribution of P (x) is ψx(E∗(x)) = 1− αx. We can treat 1(zt(x), E∗(x)) as a weight function
of the random walk, s.t. the expected total weight is
E
 1T1(x)
T1(x)∑
t=1
1(zt(x), E∗(x))
 = 1− αx, (37)
as T1(x)→∞.
According to (7), we know that an optimal NE is guaranteed to be played during the exploration phase
when the majority of trial-and-error learning plays visit E∗(x). Namely, Pr(Ax) is larger than the probability
of the event
∑T1(x)
t=1 1(z
t(x), E∗(x)) ≥ T1(x)/2. Equivalently, we obtain
Pr
(
Ax
)
= 1− Pr(Ax) ≤ Pr
L1(x)∑
t=1
1(zt(x), E∗(x)) ≤ T1(x)
2
. (38)
Then, following [33, Theorem 3.1], we have
Pr
(
Ax
) (a)≤ Pr
L1(x)∑
t=1
1(zt(x), E∗(x)) ≤ (1− ρ)ψx(E∗(x))T1(x)
 ≤ cx‖φx‖ψx exp(−ρ2ψx(E∗(x))T1(x)72τx(18)
)
,
(39)
where (a) follows (38) by setting (1− ρ)ψx(E∗(x)) ≥ 12 , ‖φx‖ψx ,
√∑
z(x)∈Z(x)
ψ2x(z(x))
φx(z(x))
, and τx(18) is the
mixing time of the Markov process P (x) for an accuracy of 1/8 (see [33, Theorem 3.1]). By selecting
a sufficiently small  for each P (x), we are able to adopt a unique target stable probability ∀x ∈ X :
ψx(E∗(x)) ≥ ψ, where ψ is a constant. We note that the right-hand side of (39) is a monotonically decreasing
function of ψx(E∗(x)). Then, we can set ψx(E∗(x)) = ψ. To ensure 0 < ρ < 1, from (1 − ρ)ψ ≥ 12 we
obtain ρ ≤ 1− 1
2ψ
and ψ > 1
2
. Then, we can choose ρ = 1− 1
2ψ
and obtain
Pr
(
Ax
) ≤ cx‖φx‖ψx exp
(
−(1−
1
2ψ
)2ψT1(x)
72τx(
1
8
)
)
. (40)
We know that (1− 1
2ψ
)2ψ is a monotonically increasing function if ψ > 1
2
. Denote cmaxX = max
x∈X
cx‖φx‖ψx ,
and T1(x) = ω(x)T1, where
∑
x∈X
ω(x) = 1. Then, for ψ > 1
2
, the right-hand side of (40) is a monotonically
decreasing function of ψ. Thereby, we can pick ψ ≥ 2
3
(consequently, ρ ≤ 1
4
), and obtain
Pr
(
Ax
) ≤ cx‖φx‖ψx exp
(
−ψ − 1 +
1
4ψ
72τx(
1
8
)
T1(x)
)
≤ cmaxX exp
(
− ω(x)T1
1728τx(
1
8
)
)
. (41)
Then, by (36) and (41) we know that the error probability after running g(k) = c2kδ rounds of trial-and-error
learning is
Prkl ≤ cmaxX
∑
x∈X
exp
(
− ω(x)T1
1728τx(
1
8
)
)
≤ XcmaxX exp
(
− ω(x)
1728τx(
1
8
)
c2k
δ
)
, (42)
where x = arg minx ω(x)/τx(18), and by construction of Algorithm 1 we have T1 = c2k
δ. Again, since the
right-hand side of (40) is a monotonically decreasing function, we can always find an epoch k ensuring
that the upper bound of Prkl shrinks to a sufficiently small value.
C. Regret Bound of Algorithm 1
Now, we have the probabilities of errors propagated from the exploration phase, i.e., Prke and the learning
phase i.e., Prkl bounded by (27) and (42), respectively. Thereby, we are ready to provide the formal proof
to Theorem 1 in the following discussion. We assume that the mild conditions such as the condition of
discernible arm-values in Lemma 2 are satisfied by the considered contextual bandit game. Recall that we
set in Algorithm 1 f(k) = c1k, g(k) = c2kδ and h(k) = c32k in each epoch of the learning process. We
suppose that the total number of epoch is K, s.t.
T ≥
K−1∑
k=1
(c1k + c2k
δ + c32
k) ≥
K−1∑
k=1
c32
k ≥ c3(2K − 2). (43)
Then, by taking logarithm to both sides of the inequality in (43), we can derive the logarithmic upper bound
of K as K ≤ log2(T/c3 + 2). The total regret incurred by the learning scheme in Algorithm 1 is composed
of three parts, namely, the regret due to action exploration, trial-and-error learning and due to sub-optimal
(erroneous) policies in the exploitation phases. We note that for each round of play the total regret of the
M players could be as large as M . Then, we obtain the regret bound of a single epoch in the form of (13).
∆Rk ≤M(c1 + c2kδ) +M(Prke + Prkl )c32k ≤M(c1+c2kδ)+M
(
4MLXe−k+XcmaxX e
− ω(x)c2kδ
1728τx(
1
8 )
)
c32
k.
(44)
We note that with δ > 1 there exists an epoch k0, s.t. ∀k ≥ k0, exp
(
− ω(x)
1728τx(
1
8
)
c2k
δ−1
)
≤ 1/e. Define
A0 = 4ML
X +XcmaxX . Then, from (44) we obtain that with β =
2
e
< 1, for k > k0
∆Rk ≤M(c1 + c2kδ) +M
(
4MLX +XcmaxX
)
c3e
−k2k ≤M(c1 + c2kδ) + A0c3Mβk, (45)
Since the second term of the right-hand side of (45) vanishes exponentially with k, we obtain that for some
constant C representing the constant regret until the first k0 epoch,
∆RT =
K∑
k=1
∆Rk ≤ C +M
K∑
k=k0+1
c1 + c2M
K∑
k=k0+1
kδ + A0c3M
K∑
k=k0+1
βk
(a)≤ C + c1M log2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
+ A0c3M
1− βK+1
1− β + c2M log
1+δ
2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
(b)≤ C1 + c1M log2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
+ c2M log
1+δ
2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
,
(46)
where (a) is obtained by replacing K with log2(T/c3 + 2), and (b) is obtained by replacing C with C1 =
C + A0c3M
1−β . Then, (46) completes the proof to Theorem 1.
VI. ADAPTATION TO UNOBSERVABLE CONTEXTS
In this section, we consider the situation where the contexts exist but are not released/observable at the
beginning of each time slot. Since the learning processes cannot be established for discernible context x
in this situation, the policy learning process for intermediate games ∀x ∈ X : G(x) in the trial-and-error
learning phase is reduced to one single perturbed Markov chain. Recall that the joint distribution of the state
and the values of each arm follows: (x, rm) ∼ Dm. Therefore, learning arm-selection without discerning
the underlying context x is reduced to a multi-arm bandit game, where the value distribution of each arm
follows the marginal distribution over rm ∼ Dm,rm : pm(rm) = Ex{prm|x(rm|x)}. Then, we can modify
Definition 2 and obtain
Definition 6 (Modified Regret). Let the expected reward of a policy pi without discerning x be denoted by
V (pi) = Ert∼Dm,rm
{∑M
m=1 v
t
m(pi)
}
. For the series {rt}Tt=1, drawn from the distribution Dm,rm , the expected
regret of algorithm B = {p˜i1, . . . , p˜iT} with respect to a policy pi is
∆R(B, pi, T ) = TV (pi)− E
[
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
vtm(p˜i
t
m)
]
. (47)
The regret of algorithm B with respect to policy space Π is
∆R(B,Π, T ) = sup
pi∈Π
TV (pi)− E
[
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
vtm(p˜i
t
m)
]
. (48)
Algorithm 3 Modified exploration phase for player m with non-observable context at the k-th epoch.
1: for t = 1, . . . , f(k) do
2: Sample an arm atm ∈ {1, . . . , L} uniformly at random and observe the feedback (atm, vtm(at))
3: if vtm(at) 6= 0 then
4: Wm ←Wm ∪ {(atm, vtm(at))}
5: Estimate the expected value of arm l = atm:
µkm,l ←
∑
(am,vm)∈Wm
vtm1(am, l)∑
(am,vm)∈Wm
1(am, l)
(49)
6: end if
7: end for
Thanks to the phase-based structure of the learning scheme, we are able to isolate the trial-and-error phase
from the exploration phase for arm-value estimation. When the arm-values of the unique intermediate game
G for each epoch is provided, it is straightforward to prove that Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 still hold
with Algorithm 2. The only difference lies in that the multiple sub-events Ax in (36) is now replaced by a
single event A. We only need to analyze the outcomes of the exploration phase, which, after removing the
contexts, is now in the form of Algorithm 3.
Based on the modified regret in Definition 6, for an arbitrary, individual policy pim that results in no
collision, the true expected reward becomes E(rm)∼Dm,rm{rm,pim}. By the law of unconscious statistician we
have E(rm)∼Dm,rm{rm,pim} = E(x,rm)∼Dm{rm,pim}. Following our discussion in Section V-A, the unbiased
reward estimator based onWm is now µˆm(pim) = 1Nm
∑Nm
i=1
1(pim,aim)v
i
m
1/L
. Then, (15) still holds for the variation
of the new estimator and for (19) we have a slightly different bound
Pr
(
sup
m∈M,pim
{
(µˆm(pim)−E{rm,pim})>η
∣∣∣∀m : |Wm|≥C}) ≤ 2ML exp(− Cη2
2L+ 2cη/3
)
, (50)
since the learning algorithm no longer discerns the underlying context x. Subsequently, for an exploration
phase that lasts for c1k rounds in epoch k, we have a new probability bound for the exploration error:
Prke = γ ≤ 4MLe−k. (51)
Therefore, without any modification to the discussion of regret bound in Section V-C, we can show that
Theorem 1 still holds with exactly the same form of bound:
∆RT ≤ C1 + c1M log2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
+ c2M log
1+δ
2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
= O(M log1+δ2 (T )). (52)
TABLE I
MAIN PARAMETERS OF ALGORITHM 1 USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.01 ξ 0.001 δ 1 c1 100 c2 200 c3 100
α11 −0.12 α12 0.15 α21 −0.35 α22 0.4 Reward range [0, 1]
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Evaluation of the Proposed Algorithm
First of all, we demonstrate the efficiency of Algorithm 1. For comparison, we implement the “Musical
Chairs” (MC) algorithm [34] as the first reference algorithm. It is worth noting that MC addresses the
decentralized MP-MAB problem in a setting of homogeneous arms and no context. We adopt the Hungarian
algorithm to indicate the ground-truth social optimal arm-allocation with a centralized allocator5. Throughout
the experiments, we adopts the parameters for the trial-and-error learning algorithm as Table I and the
parameter of total exploration rounds for MC as T0 = 3000. For convenience of demonstration, we
investigate the evolution of payoffs over time for the compared algorithms in a contextual MAB of 2
players, 3 arms and 3 contexts, where for each player, the contexts and arm values are jointly sampled from
discrete uniform distributions. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the players’ average rewards as the learning
algorithms progress over time, where the curves marked as “Static Hungarian” indicate the expected rewards
of individual players (Figure 2(a)) and the expected average reward (Figure 2(b)) at the social-optimal
allocation in the game. The gaps between the rewards of the “Trial and Error” (TnE) and the “Musical
Chairs” curves indicate that our proposed algorithm is able to better adapt to the stochastic evolution of the
contextual dimension. Meanwhile, the fluctuation in the “Trial and Error” curves reflects the epoch-based
characteristics of our proposed algorithm that accommodates unknown total number of plays, whereas the
MC algorithm has one single exploration-exploitation epoch of pre-determined rounds of explorations.
In Figure 3, we compare the evolution of the average regrets of TnE, MC and another epoch-based
decentralized learning algorithm, i.e., the Game of Thrones (GoT) algorithm [35], as the total number of
plays (horizons) T (c.f. (3)) increases. Note that GoT also adopts a decentralized, perturbation-based policy-
learning framework for social-optimal allocation, but is not able to discern the contexts in the game. In
this experiment, for the same sequence of context-arm-value sampling with a total rounds of T , the bandit
game is repeatedly played for 200 times with each algorithm. The shaded areas around each curve of the
empirical average regret represents the variance of the regret incurred by repeated plays. The dashed curve
5The source code and configurations of our experiments can be found at https://github.com/wbwang2020/MP-MAB.
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Fig. 2. (a) Average payoff of individual players with respect to time. (b) Mean average payoff of plays with respected to time.
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Fig. 3. Regret evolution with respect to the total number of plays T .
“O(M logδ2(T ))” represents the theoretical bound for the regret of TnE learning. We obtain a heuristic and
tighter bound than that of (46). Expressed in the same form as (46), the heuristic regret bound has a set of
parameters as c1M = 200, c2M = 40 and C1 = 0 for the considered game. As shown in Figure 3, GoT is
able to achieve a lower regret than MC with its expressiveness of heterogeneous arms, while TnE is able
to achieve a lower regret with a much faster convergence rate than GoT.
B. Algorithm Evaluation in Heterogeneous IoT over Shared Bandwidth
In this section, we apply our proposed learning algorithm for channel allocation in the simulation of an
ad-hoc, heterogeneous IoT network over unlicensed spectrum. We perform a series of simulations with the
focus put on the following parameters: (a) the sum of the normalized throughput (i.e., rewards), (b) the
frequency of collision and channel switching during policy learning and (c) the scalability of the proposed
algorithm. Again, throughout the simulations, we consider that the channel statistics are unknown and
heterogeneous with respect to different IoT devices. We also consider that the spectrum in concern is
licensed to a cellular network, and a number of non-moving licensed users may randomly occupy and leave
the band with different levels of transmit powers. The contexts of the bandit game reflect the IDs and the
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Fig. 4. (a) Average sum of normalized rates over time with respect to operational horizons. (b) Accumulated collisions among IoT devices
with respect to time horizons. (c) Accumulated channel switching counts among IoT devices with respect to time horizons.
power levels of the licensed users. We consider that a fixed number of randomly distributed IoT devices
move in slow motion and reuse the frequency of the licensed users for their own narrow-band transmission.
For the IoT network, the entire spectrum is divided into a fixed number of logical channels6. The IoT
devices are assumed to move following a Gauss-Markov mobility model [36]. We also assume that for each
IoT device, the multipath effect remains the same within a single time slot. Then, we obtain an MP-MAB
formulation for multi-channel allocation with stochastic interference contexts as described in Section III.
In Figure 4, we demonstrate the simulation results for a setting of 10 IoT devices over 12 logical channels
of the bandwidth, which is randomly accessed by 3 licensed users. We compare our proposed TnE algorithm
with the MC algorithm, the GoT algorithm and an MAB-based channel swapping algorithm, i.e., “Stable
Orthogonal Channel (SOC)” allocation [13]. It is worth noting that SOC is able to model the heterogeneous
distribution of arm-values in a non-contextual setting, but aims to achieve stable non-colliding allocation
instead of social-optimal network performance. For comparison, we set the perturbation parameters for GoT
and the proposed TnE algorithm to be the same as  = 0.01 and the constant parameter as c2 = 3000 to
determine the length of the learning phase. Figure 4(a) clearly shows that our proposed scheme achieves
the best performance out of the 4 algorithms in terms of normalized sum rate along the time horizon.
Figure 4(b) indicates that the better performance of the proposed algorithm is achieved at the cost of slightly
more collisions, due to frequent policy explorations over the time. Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 3,
GoT has a significantly lower convergence rate, even when the number of joint auxiliary states are smaller
6For instance, in NB-IoT-like networks, this could be implemented by grouping the OFDM symbols into a fixed number of L available
resource blocks. In each physical resource block a device experiences independent path loss and shadow fading, but face the stochastic
interference of the same transmit-power level from the underlying transmission of the UEs in the macrocell.
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Fig. 5. (a) Average sum of normalized rates over time with respect to network size. (b) Accumulated collisions among IoT devices with
respect to network size. (c) Accumulated channel switching counts among IoT devices with respect to network size.
than the proposed TnE algorithm due to ignoring the contexts. We believe this is the main reason for GoT
to experience higher collisions in Figure 4(b). In other words, GoT needs a much longer policy-learning
phase (equivalently, a larger c2) than TnE to achieve a better performance than MC. Figure 4(c) shows
the frequency of channel switching against the same contexts. More specifically, the switching frequency
measures the consistency of action-taking against different context by different algorithms. The lower the
frequency, the higher the policy consistency is. Comparing the proposed TnE algorithm with the other
reference algorithms, we can observe that with a slightly higher switching frequency, TnE is able to avoid
blindly choosing the same policy for different contexts as MC and SOC. Meanwhile, it is able to discern
different contexts and then maintain good stability in action-taking accordingly. Instead, GoT fails to do so
and thus results in frequent policy switching during the game.
Finally, we examine the scalability of different algorithms with respect to the network size in Figure 5,
for which we fix the horizon of simulations to be 4×105 rounds for different network sizes varying from 5
nodes to 30 nodes. For for each epoch in TnE and GoT, the length of the perturbation-based learning phase
is set to start with a parameter c2 = 3×103 for a network of 5 nodes and then increase proportionally as the
network size grows. As shown in Figures 5(b) and 5(c), the proposed TnE algorithm and GoT experience
more collisions than MC and SOC, as network size increases. This is mainly due to both the significantly
longer policy exploration and the larger auxiliary state space as the network size increases. Again, the
GoT algorithm needs significantly larger number of rounds to achieve the same level of performance as
MC and SOC when the network size increases. As a result, it may not scale well with the network size.
Comparatively, the proposed TnE algorithm is able to achieve the better performance (see Figure 5(a)) than
the other reference algorithms at an acceptable cost of more frequent collisions (see Figure 5(b)) and higher
policy inconsistency (see Figure 5(c)) mainly due to longer exploration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a decentralized channel-allocation algorithm based on trial-and-error learn-
ing for the IoT networks operating on the shared bandwidth. The proposed algorithm guarantees social-
optimal performance through repeatedly constructing intermediate non-cooperative games in the epoch-
based exploration-exploitation framework of multi-player, multi-armed bandits and then by learning the
equilibrium policies according to the players’ local reference states. The proposed algorithm is able to
address the situation of time-varying channels with underlying unpredictable interference from the licensed
transmissions. Theoretical analysis proves that the proposed policy-learning scheme is able to achieve the
optimal regret in O(M log1+δ2 T ) (δ > 0) complexity for a multi-player bandit game of M players along a
time horizon of T . Our proposed algorithm is especially appropriate for deployment in infrastructure-less
networks with rigid constraint on communications between links. Particularly, the only information needed
by the algorithm is about the activity states of the licensed users through beacon packet-reading and the
inter-link collision states on a channel through the receiving device’s feedback. The simulation results show
that the proposed algorithm is able to achieve better performance than a number of reference schemes on
realistic channels underlaying a licensed LTE or 5G network.
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